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On the evening of November 8, 1960, John Fitzgerald Kennedy defeated Richard Nixon 
in one of the tightest elections in United States history. In the months preceding this momentous 
election, many opponents expressed fears not only about the election of the youngest but also the 
first Catholic president. Just before the election, Bishop Everett W. Palmer of the First Methodist 
Church, called for his audience to put aside their religious prejudice and anti-Catholic fears for 
the greater good of the nation: “It is urgent for us to understand the plight of our Roman Catholic 
neighbors and be kindly.” However, the call came after an intense anti-Catholic sentiment had 
swept the nation during the campaign.2 As a Roman Catholic campaigned for the presidency, 
many feared the implications this might hold. Why relatively late in the twentieth century were 
so many Americans concerned about the risks of a Catholic president?  
The election of 1960 reflected a religious prejudice against Catholics that had followed 
America since its founding. There had been a long tradition of anti-Catholic sentiment within 
politics and popular culture, often aimed at issues such as federal funding of parochial schools or 
the papal influence on the U.S. government. These key issues followed from the influx of 
Catholic immigration of the nineteenth century to John F. Kennedy’s election. Kennedy’s 
election created an opportunity for the public paranoia about Catholicism and its implications for 
rising political attention as well as an opportunity to voice their fears. To Protestants, Kennedy 
demonstrated a real threat of Vatican violations of the establishment clause.  
Anti-Catholic rhetoric began with the key foundational documents such as the U.S. 
Constitution. Many of the values in these documents reflected Protestant ideals such as the 
separation of church and state. Protestants saw “separation as a cornerstone of American 
 
2 Everett W. Palmer, “Some Issues Between Catholics and Protestants,” 22 September 1957 – October 16, 1960, 
News Clippings, 1960: February – October, John F. Kennedy Library Digital Collections; at 
https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JWPP/001/JWPP-001-003. Accessed October 2019.  
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freedom;” however, this cornerstone reflected the status in society that they held during this time 
period.3 Often values such as these over time became elements of U.S. culture and society due to 
the Protestant influence in early American history. Catholicism, in the minds of the Protestant 
leaders, demonstrated a true threat to the separation of church and state as seen in the public 
funding for parochial schools and religious authority within the federal government. Even though 
the founding fathers wrote for religious separation and tolerance, that tolerance had boundaries 
as seen in these various sublanguages that dictated republican ideologies. Within the writings, to 
combat the influence of “undesirable religions" certain sublanguages proved the distaste within 
American society.4 Anti-Catholicism became a prominent example of this due to the fear of 
arbitrary power and papal forces. Catholicism did not fall in line with the Protestant values 
placed in the nation’s founding. These Protestant values defaulted to become American values, 
which held the basis for early political thought and thus influenced the American people for 
centuries.5 These guiding principles often showed the actions of a moral person reflected in areas 
such as human nature and government. 6 The Declaration of Independence and the United States 
Constitution demonstrated this through the Protestant ideals put forth which influenced various 
areas of American life.  
Because of this foundation of Protestant values, it is not surprising that the strong Anti-
Catholic sentiment flourished during the Irish immigration that picked up after 1815. In the 
conflict between Anglo-Saxon Protestants and Irish Catholics, strong allegiances developed in 
 
3 Richard V. Pierard. 1983. “Standing the Founding Fathers on Their Heads.” The Christian Century 100 (12): 368–
72. https://search-ebscohost-com.proxy.lib.uiowa.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=rfh&AN=ATLA0000930806.  
4 Mark Noll 1993. “The American Revolution and Protestant Evangelicalism.” The Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History. Vol. 23 (3): 615-638. https://www.jstor.org/stable/206105.  
5 Prichard V. Pierard. 1983. “Standing the Founding Fathers on Their Heads.” The Christian Century 100 (12): 368–
72. https://search-ebscohost-com.proxy.lib.uiowa.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=rfh&AN=ATLA0000930806. 
6 Mark A. Noll. 1993. “The American Revolution and Protestant Evangelicalism.” The Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History. Vol. 23 (3): 615-638. https://www.jstor.org/stable/206105.  
 4 
the two sides that led to various stereotypes evolving.7 The emergence of a new generation of 
immigrants into the country brought to light the fears that had been inherited from America’s 
founding.  With the rise of this new population, the concept of anti-Catholicism grew as it 
centered around this new working class.  
Who were these new people? Anti-Catholic Protestant proponents viewed them as an 
inferior ethnicity, who were “polluting the country, and did not have the intelligence or moral 
character to ever become positive or productive community members.”8 Many Catholic 
immigrants arrived in the country with no true formal education or with only basic farming 
skills. When they started to migrate into the city, many established workers viewed them as 
lower class and as a threat to their way of life. Many Anti-Catholic sentiments such as the one 
above showed an attack on class status.  
 Originally, Anti-Catholicism began as a disdain of those of a lower class but grew into 
the fear of Vatican influence. The more outspoken of the Protestant population described the 
Catholic Church as “an institution they viewed as incompatible with republic principles.”9 The 
allegiances that the Catholics held for a prominent figure in a foreign land seemed to contrast 
with the belief of the American republican government. This concept centered around the idea 
that Catholics would fall to the authority of the Pope in Vatican City, even above their central 
government. Vatican City and the religion contrasted the fundamental Protestant values for its 
reliance on an authoritarian government and forced religion.  
As Irish Catholics sought refuge, the American public felt that the threat to their way of 
life was immediate, especially in their education system. Nativists insisted that public schools 
 
7 Lawrence John McCaffrey. The Irish Catholic Diaspora in America. Revised ed. Washington, D.C.: Catholic 
University of America Press, 1997. 
8 Noel Ignatiev. How the Irish Became White. New York: Routledge, 1995. 
9 Ibid.  
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were necessary for the assimilation of immigrants and that parochial schools threatened 
American values.10 The school systems provided the opportunities for the education of the 
republican ideals that the American Protestants feared that Catholics would violate. Yet the 
Catholics responded to this concept by pushing reform for themselves, through a demand of state 
financing as a tool against the secularism.11 To combat the anti-Catholic sentiment, Catholics 
lobbied for legislation changes and their candidates. However, the Catholic political momentum 
also brought forth a reactionary rise of anti-Catholic politicians. These politicians held platforms 
that fought against “popery” (Papal Influence) as well as parochial schools.12  
One reason that these politicians could gain prominent standing stemmed from the 
support of nativist organizations such as the second Ku Klux Klan.  The Klan, a prominent 
outspoken nativist organization during the 1920s, brought the anti-Catholicism notions from the 
nineteenth to the twentieth century. The Klan’s new mission centered around “sacralizing the 
American nation and demonizing the Catholic Church” through various events.13 As the 1924 
Immigration Act14 curtailed immigration, the Klan’s anti-Catholic bias gained momentum and 
the Klan took advantage of the aftereffects through escalated tactics.15 The Klan rose from this 
tension and tapped into the controversy that seemed to be growing. Their actions from burning 
crosses in the yards of known Catholics to the outwards resentments of Catholic candidates for 
 
10John Lawrence McCaffrey The Irish Catholic Diaspora in America. Revised ed. Washington, D.C.: Catholic 
University of America Press, 1997. 
11 Ibid.  
12 Ibid. 
13 Lynn S. Neal "Christianizing the Klan: Alma White, Branford Clarke, and the Art of Religious 
Intolerance." Church History 78, no. 2 (2009): 350-78. 
14 The Immigration Act of 1924 limited the number of immigrants allowed entry into the United States through a 
national origins’ quota. Office of the Historian. “The Immigration Act of 1924 (The Johnson–Reed Act).” Office of 
the Historian. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/immigration-act. 
15 Lynn Dumenil "The Tribal Twenties: "Assimilated" Catholics' Response to Anti-Catholicism in the 
1920s." Journal of American Ethnic History 11, no. 1 (1991): 21-49. 
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public offices kept this religious intolerance alive throughout the beginning of the twentieth 
century fueling momentum into the 1960s election.  
The Klan’s actions focused primarily on forcing Christian fundamentalism on two 
religious issues within the schools: the use of Bible readings in schools and the eradication of 
Roman Catholic influences.16 According to the Klan, Catholicism poisoned the thoughts of 
children while turning them towards the Pope. Catholic teachings as viewed by nativist 
organizations became a tool towards allying themselves with the Pope. Many “feared the 
temporal power that Rome supposedly sought and wielded – the use of its loyal followers to 
erase the separation of church and state in a quest for national and world domination.”17 The 
violations of such an esteemed clause in the United States’ Constitution struck a chord in the 
minds of the public that would resonate for generations, especially in the upcoming election 
years.  
Al Smith, a Roman Catholic and the 1928 Democratic candidate demonstrated an 
immediate threat to the Ku Klux Klan that forced them to fight for their values of Anglo-
Protestant America18 The 1928 presidential election pinned the Republican Secretary of 
Commerce Herbert Hoover against the Democratic nominee, Governor Al Smith of New York. 
The competition proved competitive due to various controversial issues of the time such as 
Prohibition.19 Smith began to experience intense religious debate throughout the election for he 
refused to answer any questions about his religion, “holding that his beliefs were nobody’s 
 
16 Philip N. Racine "The Ku Klux Klan, Anti-Catholicism, and Atlanta's Board of Education, 1916-1927." The 
Georgia Historical Quarterly 57, no. 1 (1973): 63-75. 
17 Lynn S. Neal "Christianizing the Klan: Alma White, Branford Clarke, and the Art of Religious 
Intolerance." Church History 78, no. 2 (2009): 350-78. 
18 John Lawrence McCaffrey The Irish Catholic Diaspora in America. Revised ed. Washington, D.C.: Catholic 
University of America Press, 1997. 
19 Dave Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Elections, “1928 Presidential General Election Results,” 2019, at 
https://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/national.php?year=1928. Accessed November 2019.  
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business but his own.”20 Smith believed that religion would have no place in the election and 
attempted to focus on policies. He stressed opposition to Prohibition, which many voters saw as 
a “symbol of the pride of immigrants and urban Americans.”21 Every policy that Smith tried to 
bring to light only furthered religious discussions that he continued to marginalize. Smith 
believed that any religious issue stemmed from bigotry and from that he wanted to avoid it but 
when it proved impossible, he wanted to deny the influence as much as possible.22 But he could 
not pull enough votes for a victory. Herbert Hoover defeated Al Smith by 444 electoral votes to 
Alfred Smith’s eight.23 Even if the Smith campaign did not prove victorious, it created the first 
Catholic campaign with background context of combat of the Catholic issues.  
The first Catholic Presidential candidate animated the fears that arose through the new 
immigration, which took hold of the 1928 election. By 1928 a new generation of Americans had 
grown up more accustomed to religious, ethnic, and cultural pluralism. Even with the melding of 
the new cultures, there were many still persecuted such as African Americans and Catholics, by 
nativist organizations. When a new candidate, who stood for all these disadvantaged populations, 
it seemed that a new light was rising across American history. “Al Smith embodied the 
incarnation of their [Jewish, African Americans and Catholics alike] own hope and pride; he is 
the man who had gone, as they would like but do not quite dare to go out into the great world to 
lift them from the secret sense of inferiority.”24 To many immigrants and Catholics Al Smith 
 
20 Michael J. Hostetler. "Gov. Al Smith Confronts the Catholic Question: The Rhetorical Legacy of the 1928 
Campaign." Communication Quarterly 46, no. 1 (1998): 12-24. 
21 Thomas J. Carty. 2004. A Catholic In the White House? New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
22 Michael J. Hostetler. "Gov. Al Smith Confronts the Catholic Question: The Rhetorical Legacy of the 1928 
Campaign." Communication Quarterly 46, no. 1 (1998): 12-24. 
23 Dave Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Elections, “1928 Presidential General Election Results,” 2019, at 
https://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/national.php?year=1928. Accessed November 2019. 
24 Thomas J. Carty. 2004. A Catholic In the White House? New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
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represented a knight in shining armor to fight off the oppressive majority through various 
political challenges to come.  
The fear of an immediate violation of the Church and State arose in the context of 
Smith’s campaign. Alabama Senator Thomas Hesflin spoke to the population by calling them to 
“guard your loins for political battle against Smith, lest the heavy hand of a Catholic state…crush 
the life out of Protestantism America.”25 Heslfin’s words alluded to the fear that the Protestant 
values expressed in the foundation of the United States were under attack. Smith became a target 
of divided loyalty between American ideology and his Catholic faith, which threatened the 
individual liberty. The public began to wonder if a devoted Roman Catholic president could be 
capable of running a democracy.26 Anti-Smith Protestants chose to capitalize on this by playing 
into the paranoia of Smith’s allegiance. They spread around that “because the Church of Rome 
demands absolute allegiance in faith and morals, because it is virtually impossible to separate 
politics from questions of morals, Catholics could not be unswervingly loyal to American 
institutions.”27  
After receiving a large amount of attention about his religious influence, Smith and his 
campaign team developed strategies that proved ineffective in his election. Originally, Smith 
believed that a large part of the religious issue stemmed from bigotry. He “sought to downplay 
and if possible, avoid it or dispatch the issue as quickly as possible.”28 His attempts to draw 
attention away from the issue, it only fanned the fire of anti-Catholic sentiment. “The persistence 
of the Catholic Question for Smith, and for Kennedy, thirty–three years later, had more to do 
 
25 Thomas J. Carty. 2004. A Catholic In the White House? New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
26 Michael J. Hostetler. "Gov. Al Smith Confronts the Catholic Question: The Rhetorical Legacy of the 1928 
Campaign." Communication Quarterly 46, no. 1 (1998): 12-24. 
27 Ibid.  
28 Ibid. 
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with the perception of their audience than with any characteristics.”29  The real issue within the 
election was not the religious beliefs of the candidate but rather how the audience perceived the 
religion.  
Common issues about Anti-Catholicism throughout history have remained prevalent in 
the public eye. A common theme across these issues is the potential violation that would occur in 
the separation of church and state. The most prominent of these Catholic influences centered the 
belief of a Catholic’s unyielding loyalty to the Pope. The public remained fearful that a Catholic 
president would be torn in his allegiance between American values and the Catholic faith. A fear 
that would come out of this came in the form of parochial schools. Throughout history, people 
feared that Catholic schools would gain a strong power in the American system. The issues in 
education and papal influence remained large both in Smith’s election but loftier in Kennedy’s.  
Smith’s statement of his faith in his country and final stance on his religion mirrored that 
of the Nicene Creed in hopes to reassure the public: 
I believe in the worship of God according to the faith and practice of the Roman 
Catholic Church. I recognize no power in the institutions of my Church to 
interfere with the operations of the Constitution of the US or the enforcement of 
the law of the land. I believe in the absolute separation of church and state and in 
the strict enforcement…... I believe in the support of the public school as one of 
the cornerstones of American liberty.30  
  
Smith’s attempt to rid himself of the religious issue proved only to be a large hindrance that 
ended with his loss in the election.  
The Election of 1960:  
John F. Kennedy’s campaign proved successful in turning the “Catholic Issue” from a 
challenge to an advantage due to their candidate’s charisma, political record but most 
 
29 Michael J. Hostetler. "Gov. Al Smith Confronts the Catholic Question: The Rhetorical Legacy of the 1928 
Campaign." Communication Quarterly 46, no. 1 (1998): 12-24. 
30 Ibid.  
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importantly because of the ability to build off the failures that the Al Smith Campaign 
demonstrated. The Kennedy campaign sought to improve on the strategies of the previous 
Catholic election to gain public approval despite persistent Anti-Catholic sentiment of the time. 
Kennedy’s campaign team says that the 1928 campaign of New York Governor Alfred E. Smith 
offered the Kennedy staff “little precedent for guidance in developing an appropriate strategy.”31 
Even though the strategies of Smith’s campaign team could not provide the assistance that 
another Catholic candidate would encounter, it proved evidence of the anti-Catholic sentiment 
that can be traced throughout history through various key issues.   
Many feared that Kennedy held loyalty to the Vatican government and that his bond to 
the United States would not hold up under Vatican influence. In the question of the separation of 
church and state, would the Church of Rome rule over the United States? The Catholic influence 
did not stop with the “popery,” but also seemed to touch upon a fundamental quality of the 
United States, the education system. The confrontations of the two opposing forces could be 
viewed as “a battle of religious liberty against religious intolerance; true freedom against false 
freedom; real Americanism against bogus Americanism.”32 The idea that parochial schools could 
provide the education of republican philosophies or that the Catholic president could stay 
unbiased was unthinkable, especially during the political elections of Catholic candidates.   
 As Al Smith campaigned in the wake of the nineteenth century with the Protestant 
nativist movement regarding immigration growing, John F. Kennedy faced a challenge in the 
revival of Christianity at the end of World War II due to its aftermath.33 With this change in time 
 
31 Michael J. Hostetler. "Gov. Al Smith Confronts the Catholic Question: The Rhetorical Legacy of the 1928 
Campaign." Communication Quarterly 46, no. 1 (1998): 12-24. 
32 Lynn Dumenil "The Tribal Twenties: "Assimilated" Catholics' Response to Anti-Catholicism in the 
1920s." Journal of American Ethnic History 11, no. 1 (1991): 21-49. 
33 Michael J. Hostetler. "Gov. Al Smith Confronts the Catholic Question: The Rhetorical Legacy of the 1928 
Campaign." Communication Quarterly 46, no. 1 (1998): 12-24. 
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came the passage of an entire generation, one that had grown up in an area where nationalism ran 
rampant. World War II had supplied an opportunity for a large movement in nation-building. 
Anyone who lived within the United States regardless of religious affiliation became an 
American for it was all hands-on deck.  
Nevertheless, when the war concluded, one would assume that when the strong 
nationalist tendencies cemented themselves into American culture, there would be no more 
religious intolerance. Anti-Catholic ideology rose its ugly head again. Protestant and Other 
Americans United for Separation of Church and State organization (POAU) lawyer Paul B. 
Blanshard, described the criticism of Catholicism of the 1960’s “as an ideological battle about 
public policy, not private religious faith: the new opposition [to the Catholic Church] is strongest 
among the liberals who have always stood most courageously for personal tolerance.”34 
Kennedy’s election expanded upon the notions of anti-Catholicism during Smith’s election. The 
key issues that Smith experienced met the Kennedy campaign head-on, but Kennedy knew how 
to play to the strengths of the public with his charisma. Kennedy became the successful white 
knight of the disadvantaged, as well as an inspiration to those who had to overcome large 
obstacles in their private lives.   
The situation involving the “Chapel of the Four Chaplains,” proved to be one of the most 
cited religious incidents throughout Kennedy’s term that sparked religious controversy. In 1947, 
after Kennedy’s election into Congress, Dr. Daniel Polling, a prominent American clergyman, 
invited Kennedy to attend a dinner as a fundraiser for “an interfaith chapel in honor of the four 
chaplains who went down on the Dorchester.”35 Kennedy accepted the invitation, without 
 
34 Thomas J. Carty. 2004. A Catholic In the White House? New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
35 The Dorchester was a US Army Troop shift that went down after the Germans fired three torpedoes off the coast 
of Greenland on February 3, 1943. NPR, “The Sinking of the Dorchester,” May 28, 2001. 
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1123610 date accessed October 2019.  
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knowing it was not occurring in the chapel itself but rather in the basement of a church where a 
Catholic mass was never celebrated. Even though the fundraiser occurred in an area that did not 
coincide with the Catholic church, Kennedy still wanted to attend because he assumed, he was 
going in a public servant. But Polling had invited Kennedy to be the spokesperson for the 
Catholic faith.36 Kennedy saw this as an affront to his position; he did not have the credentials to 
be a representative of his faith. He turned down the invitation when he learned of the truth for it 
seemed to compromise his integrity as an elected official. Kennedy expressed in a speech given 
when running for president that explained, “whether I as Senator or President I would attend a 
function (religious or not) if my public service is connected with my position.”37 Whether it was 
a public or religious obligation the role of the public officials would take precedence to his 
religious obligations.  
As the seasons of primary elections began in March of 1960, the early anxieties reflected 
those of the 1928 election. Catholics and non-Catholics alike feared that this election could 
revive all the horrible sentiments of an election in the not-so-distant past. Even avid Catholics 
feared that Kennedy’s campaign “might trigger a revival of nativism, and with it the 
defensiveness and insecurity of their people.”38 The Catholic candidate continued to bring to life 
the anti-Catholic ideology to light through the press. Kennedy did not want his religion to be an 
obstacle in his election and wanted to prove to skeptical party leaders that the religious issue did 
not scare him.  
 
36 Pierre Salinger, Letter to Edward McGlinn, December 15, 1960, Salinger, Pierre Box, John F. Kennedy Library 
Digital Collections; at https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKPOF/065/JFKPOF-065-004. Accessed 
October 2019.  
37 Ibid.  
38 Ibid.  
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 The Wisconsin primary proved to be one of the more controversial primaries due to the 
amount of religions focus that occurred. The propagation of anti-Catholic sentiment can be seen 
through the local media in Wisconsin, which stressed how “bigotry” continued to rise through 
the distribution of various Protestant pamphlets.39 Much of this propaganda centered around how 
the control of the Roman Catholic faith would influence the current Democratic candidate.  
 Kennedy’s campaign team saw these tactics as a prime example of how the Catholic vote 
could boost Kennedy’s support.40 The rationale behind this support centered around Kennedy’s 
connection with the voters. The voters found him relatable due to the faith they shared; it 
strengthened the status they felt in American society.41 Since a Catholic had never before been 
considered acceptable enough by the dominant Protestant group to be sent to the White House.  
 Even with religious support, Kennedy did not want the election to focus on his 
Catholicism. The press continued to flog this issue while simultaneously ignoring the facts of the 
elections. Kennedy spoke of this in great detail, for when he detailed his plan for Wisconsin, “for 
example, on farm legislation, foreign policy, defense, and civil rights issues,”42 his positions did 
not hold the front page spots that his religion did. Yet, despite Kennedy’s annoyance about the 
 
39 Bob Siegrist. Letter to Senator John F. Kennedy, November 9, 1959, Religion Correspondence, John F. Kennedy 
Library Digital Collections; at 
https://www.jfklibrary.org/assetviewer/archives/JFKCAMP1960/1049/JFKCAMP1960-1049-019, Accessed 
October 2019.  
40 Gerard A. Brandmeyer. “Projection of the Issue of Religion Into the 1960 Presidential Campaign”, Received April 
26, 1960. Catholic Issue Box, John F. Kennedy Library Digital Collections; at https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-
viewer/archives/JFKCAMP1960/1044/JFKCAMP1960-1044-015, accessed October 2019.  
41 Ibid.  
42 John F. Kennedy Speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, “The Religion Issue in American 
Politics,” Washington D.C., April 21, 1960. Speech Files, 1953 – 1960, John F. Kennedy Library Digital 
Collections; at https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKSEN/0908/JFKSEN-0908-022. Accessed 
October 2019.  
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lack of attention to his policies, Kennedy pulled ahead in the primary with 56.5 percent of the 
primary vote against Hubert H. Humphrey’s 43.5 percent.43  
 In the wake of various primary losses, Humphrey addressed Kennedy about his 
campaign’s use of religion as an advantage. He warned that “Kennedy would not receive the 
same religious advantage in the next primary battle in West Virginia, where only 4 percent of the 
population was Catholic.”44 Humphrey stressed that the Kennedy campaign could not utilize the 
same tactics in West Virginia. Kennedy continued to deny that his faith would play that big of a 
role in his election, especially in the wake of the policies he hoped to bring to light in West 
Virginia. West Virginia would provide the challenge to the Catholic candidate that many skeptics 
predicted.  
 Politicians and the public alike played a key role in trying to sway people in the opposite 
direction. Local politicians used the primary as a chance to influence the public into thinking that 
Kennedy was too young and the United States was not ready for a Catholic in the White House.45 
Many Protestants believed that it was too soon to test the allegiance of Rome versus the loyalty 
to Washington. In a statement provided by a local, Victor J. Gabriel of Clarksburg, West 
Virginia, the reality behind the public perception of the Catholic issue surfaced; “the religious 
thing in the country here was not a factor, not an issue.”46 If it was not an issue in the local 
counties of West Virginia why did the campaign team have to continue to develop strategies to 
combat it? Kennedy believed that the religious issue came from the press, who continued to 
 
43 John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, “Results of 1960 Presidential Election Primaries,” 
https://jfklibrary.org/learn https://www.jfklibrary.org/learn/about-jfk/life-of-john-f-kennedy/fast-facts-john-f-
kennedy/results-of-1960-presidential-election-primaries.  
44 Thomas J. Carty. 2004. A Catholic In the White House? New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
45 William Young. “The John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Project, the West Virginia Democratic Presidential 
Primary, 1960,” 1982, ProQuest Dissertations and Theses. 
46 Ibid.  
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publicize religious articles rather than his positions on policy.47 The press had continued to bring 
the issue to the forefront of voters’ minds.  
 A mock poll was conducted in West Virginia and it showed Kennedy trailing by 20 
points. Kennedy became tired of his constant attempts to discredit the issue; he decided the best 
thing to do was to address the anti-Catholic sentiment which had swept the state.48 In a speech 
conducted in front of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Kennedy spoke of the 
“Religious Issue” to those who had fueled the fire.  
There is only one legitimate question underlying all the rest of the press questions 
on my religion: would you, as President of the United States, be responsive in any 
way to ecclesiastical pressure or obligations of any kind that might in any fashion 
influence or interfere with your conduct of that office in the national interest? I 
have answered that question many times, my answer was and is NO. 49 
 
Through Kennedy’s acknowledgment, he had demonstrated how key the religious issue 
had played so far into the election. Kennedy followed similar remarks made by Smith in the 
denial of religious influence in his policies. The anti-Catholic sentiment that often transformed 
into the Anti-Kennedy ideology had swept the nation and threw the public in a conflict of the 
private and public spheres of the candidate’s life. “I happen to believe I can serve my nation as 
President – and I also happen to have been born a Catholic.”50 An aspect of the candidate’s 
private life became a large factor in his election into public office, often was framed as his fault.  
Many people believed that Kennedy only made these speeches and declarations to gain 
public attention, much to Kennedy’s dismay. Through this speech, Kennedy attempted to tell 
 
47 JFK Speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Speech Files, 1953 – 1960, John F. Kennedy Library 
Digital Collections; at https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKSEN/0908/JFKSEN-0908-022. 
Accessed October 2019. 
48 John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum Writers, “John F. Kennedy and Religion,” 
https://www.jfklibrary.org/learn/about-jfk/jfk-in-history/john-f-kennedy-and-religion. Date Accessed October 2019.  
49 JFK Speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Speech Files, 1953 – 1960, John F. Kennedy Library 
Digital Collections; at https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKSEN/0908/JFKSEN-0908-022. 
Accessed October 2019. 
50 Ibid.  
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everyone about his dislike of such a subject. He did not want to become a symbol or a martyr for 
those who have felt oppressed for generations. Kennedy did not deliberately run for office to 
give a voice to the Catholic minority, also stating, “neither do I want anyone to support my 
candidacy merely to prove that this nation is not bigoted – and that a Catholic can be elected.”51  
After reassurance that Kennedy did not seek publicity for his religious issue, he went on 
to explain the specific policy measures that worried the Protestant anti-Kennedy groups. 
Protestants believed that through the examples of a violation of the separation of church and 
state, Catholic influence was prevalent. “Federal assistance to parochial schools, for example, is 
a very legitimate issue actually before Congress. I am opposed to it; I believe it is clearly 
unconstitutional.” 52 The federal aid to parochial schools became an issue during his time in the 
Senate, yet when it came to the vote, Kennedy adamantly opposed. Through this example, 
Kennedy had shown his allegiance to his country and his conscience in leaving his faith in his 
private life. Kennedy continued to demonstrate, despite relentless badgering by the press and 
Protestant groups, how he placed the country above his gain.  
After the success following the speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, 
Ted Sorenson, Kennedy’s head strategist, believed that Kennedy needed to confront which 
direction to take his campaign. One idea called for Kennedy to withdraw from the Presidential 
nomination and to accept the Vice-Presidential nomination. If he were to take this path, he would 
have “avoided a dangerous religious controversy” while simultaneously “placating the so-called 
Catholic vote.”53 Kennedy responded to this discussion with anger for it treated “Catholics as a 
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pawn on the political chessboard.”54 In doing this, a nation that had preached religious tolerance 
took a step back in time. Kennedy supports this in his statement: “Are we going to admit to the 
world that a Jew can be elected Amy of Dublin, a Moslem can serve in the Israeli Parliament but 
a Catholic cannot be the President of the United States?”55 How was it that the most powerful 
country in the world could have held such an old-world value? 
Kennedy chose to distance himself from the idea of Vice-Presidency through his denial 
of implications of his candidacy as a symbol for the disadvantaged populations. He did not run 
for President to change the course of religious history. He proved that he could invoke strong 
political change in the areas of policy that truly count such as foreign policy, and civil rights 
despite his religion. “I am not the Catholic candidate for President; I do not speak for the 
Catholic Church on issue such as public policy. It had no claim over my conduct as a public 
official sworn to the public interest.”56 After such large media coverage focused on West 
Virginia’s primary, Kennedy believed that he had finally put an end to the religious issue. At the 
beginning of May, the primary election in West Virginia came to an end with Kennedy gaining 
60.8 percent of the vote and Humphrey 39.2 percent of the vote.57  Following the primary, no 
Democrat publicly raised the issue and many West Virginians supported Kennedy because of his 
forthrightness. 
Kennedy’s campaign team, head strategists Theodore Sorenson and Raphael Dungan did 
not believe such a pivotal issue could be over so easy. They produced key strategies to take with 
them to each of the primary locations. Their first suggestion was to create a “national statement 
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by prominent clergy deploring issues.”58 This statement addressed to the various Protestant 
members to show validity behind Kennedy’s positions. The team also suggested the candidate 
attend various television shows, for Kennedy had a strong presence on camera, to answer 
questions in which 50 percent should be on religion.59 They decided against another strategy but 
because of its similarities to the propaganda given by different anti-Catholic groups. They 
thought a strategy could be to “distribute brochure on religious issues, with materials from the 
same document, pictures of John F. Kennedy in uniform and with Protestant leaders.”60 Often 
anti-Catholic groups used this tactic to spread their propaganda, so Kennedy’s campaign team 
sought to distance themselves from the opposition.  
 Through Kennedy’s implementations of these strategies as well as his speech to the 
American Society of Newspaper Editors, Kennedy succeeded in gaining the approval of those 
within his party. In a correspondence written to the American Unitarian Association Kennedy 
wrote about his success in the religious issue, “my position, it seems to me, had been stated with 
sufficient precision so that my religious affiliations should not serve as a barrier to those who 
might wish to support the Democratic Party.”61 He thought he stated clearly and efficiently that 
Catholicism would play no role in his presidency. The skeptical party leaders believed in 
Kennedy’s ability to fight off the future prejudice they saw on the horizon but also in his policies 
for Kennedy secured the nomination on July 15, 1960, in Los Angeles, California.  
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 Following his presidential nomination, Kennedy thought he had put the religious issue to 
bed, however, the press continued to badger him to make a statement. Dr. Glenn L. Archer, 
executive director of the group Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church 
and State called for “a Catholic candidate for President should answer a number of questions. 
Failure to do so would leave many Protestants ‘apprehensive.”62 Finally, Kennedy conceded into 
commenting in an article written in Look Magazine, which would prove key to his campaign. As 
a new wave of religious tolerance grew, Kennedy realized that due to his status as the 
Democratic candidate he “must state clearly his views on the church-state issue.”63  
Whatever one’s religion in his private life may be for the officeholder, nothing 
takes precedence over his oath to uphold the Constitution and all its parts – 
including the First Amendment and the strict separation of church and state……I 
am flatly opposed to appointment of an ambassador to the Vatican.…. Following, 
the First Amendment to the Constitution is an infinitely wise one. There can be no 
question of Federal funds being used for support of parochial or private schools.64 
 
Kennedy demonstrated the pull that he felt toward the United States Constitution. His record of 
service and his continuous statement of his political leaning tried to ease the fears of the 
Protestant majority. Where the Protestants feared the stifling of their religious freedom, Kennedy 
went ahead to reassure that no such influence exists and had never existed. His belief in the 
separation of two spheres of life continued throughout his entire career, not only during his 
campaign as president. Even though proponents of anti-Catholic sentiment during the time 
stressed how the Catholic Church calls for the civil authority to use its ability to compel 
obedience, Kennedy repeatedly proved his distance from this perceived obedience.  
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              Through Kennedy’s willingness to speak out on the religious issue, he deviated from the 
Al Smith election, which led to his victory. Where Smith decided to not address the role of 
religion in public speeches, Kennedy chose to capitalize on his ability to speak to the public 
clearly and concisely. In August, the Kennedy campaign team decided they should conduct a 
survey to gauge how the public perceived Kennedy in the wake of his various public 
appearances. The survey indicated that “Nixon led Kennedy 39.5 percent to 37.5 percent with 23 
percent of the voters still undecided.”65 This survey affirmed fears that they have held since the 
West Virginian primary. The religion issue did not go away; the public still feared the loss of 
personal liberty. However, the campaign team decided to look at the religious issue as an 
advantage. His Catholicism could bring minority voters even though he would lose Protestant 
votes.66 To pull the voters into Kennedy’s side, he needed to make another speech. He had 
addressed at the state level with positive results; now it was time to address the nation.  
              On September 12, 1960, John F. Kennedy spoke to a group of Protestant Ministers 
finally bringing national light to the Catholic issue.67 To the campaign team, this speech 
represented a key moment in the campaign; based on the rumors of anti-Catholic sentiment 
gaining power the risk was worth it. There was no alternative to directly addressing the religion 
issue before a potentially hostile Protestant audience. Yet, the speech went past the Protestant 
audience but also to the large Catholic population who “might be sensitive to any perception that 
he somehow might sell out his religion or church in the name of political expediency.”68 The 
speech provided the perfect avenue for which Kennedy turned the adversity he faced into a 
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triumph as an element of his personality. It renewed momentum into his campaign by utilizing 
what he learned from Al Smith’s lack of confrontation but still staying loyal to his country.  
             Kennedy embraced his Catholicism and argued that it was possible to be a president who 
happens to be Catholic as well as honor the American Constitution. Reverend Herbert Meza, the 
Vice President of the Association and the Program Chairman emphasized the need for the 
speech: “the fact that the senator is with us is to concede that a religious issue does exist.”69  
Kennedy builds off of this baseline by attempting to connect this issue to the real ones 
throughout the election. He stressed that this should not be how he spends his time on the 
campaign trail. “There are not religious issues for war and hunger and ignorance and despair 
knowing no religious barriers.”70 Though this statement, Kennedy had added validity to the fears 
that have propagated the question, he is acknowledging that it is an issue and must be addressed 
while trying to marginalize the issue itself but simultaneously reassuring the public.  
I believe in an America where the separation of church and state is absolute. 
Where no church or church school is granted any public funds or political 
preference – and where no man is denied public office merely because his religion 
differs from the President who might appoint him or the people who might elect 
him. I believe in an America that is neither Catholic, Protestant nor Jewish – 
where no public official either requests or accepts instructions on public policy  
from the Pope, the National Council of Churches or any other ecclesiastical 
source – where no religious body seeks to impose its will directly or indirectly 
upon the general populace or the public acts of its officials.71  
 
 Kennedy outlined what he believed America is based on the Protestant values of the founding 
fathers. It was bigger than his faith and concerned about the lives of every American. In 
addressing these specific issues, he looked to combat all the distinct fears of violation of the 
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separation of church and state that the public’s fears. This content looked to strongly influence 
the voter’s perception of Kennedy’s religion. It was the moment where Kennedy accepted the 
role religion had played in the election. No longer did he deny the press claims of religion as a 
factor in the campaign. Kennedy switched the negative religious factor into an advantage. Yet, 
even with his acknowledgment, he urged the public to look inside of themselves, past the 
religious prejudice that had influenced United States history for generations and look at Kennedy 
for his political views rather than his private beliefs.  
I ask you tonight to follow in that tradition – to judge me on the basis of my 
record of 14 years in Congress – on my declared stands against an Ambassador to 
the Vatican, against unconstitutional aid to parochial schools…. I am not the 
Catholic candidate for President. I am the Democratic Party’s candidate for 
President who happens also to be a Catholic. I do not speak for my church on 
public matters – and the church does not speak for me.72 
 
Kennedy’s address to the Houston Ministerial Association altered the course of the election, for 
he did what Al Smith refused to. He chose to express his true thoughts about the religious issue 
head-on both to prove his firm standing but as an attempt to confront the public. Many Protestant 
ministers reflected on this speech as the confirmation they sought, describing it as “the most 
complete, unequivocal and reassuring statement which could be expected of any person in his 
position.”73 Kennedy legitimized the role his religion would play in the election and used it to his 
advantage.  
              Following the speech, Kennedy allowed for a period of question and answers with the 
various ministers. These questions continued to stress Kennedy’s perceived connection to the 
 
72JFK Speech to the Greater Houston Ministerial Association, Historic Speeches, John F. Kennedy Library Digital 
Collections; at https://www.jfklibrary.org/learn/about-jfk/historic-speeches/address-to-the-greater-houston-
ministerial-association, Accessed October 2019. 
73 Michael McConnell. "IS THERE STILL A "CATHOLIC QUESTION" IN AMERICA? REFLECTIONS ON 
JOHN F. KENNEDY'S SPEECH TO THE HOUSTON MINISTERIAL ASSOCIATION." The Notre Dame Law 
Review 86, no. 4 (2011): 1635-1653. 
 23 
Vatican as if the speech had not answered them enough. When asked if the Vatican had approved 
Kennedy’s statement relative to the religious freedom as separated in the Constitution, Kennedy 
responded that he did not accept “the right of an ecclesiastical official to tell me what I should do 
in my sphere of public responsibility.”74 His statements were a matter of his own beliefs without 
Catholic influence, further strengthening the divide between the ant-Catholic values. “It seems to 
me that I am the one that is running for the office of the Presidency and not Cardinal Cushing 
and not anyone else.”75 The questions seemed to imply that Kennedy would become a puppet of 
an authoritarian head of another state no matter how many times Kennedy had denied this case.  
If this election is decided on the basis that 40 million Americans lost their chance 
of being President on the day they were baptized, then it is the whole nation that 
will be the loss, in the eyes of Catholics and non-Catholics around the world, in 
the eyes of history and in the eyes of our own people.76  
 
If the public allowed for Kennedy’s faith to become the sole factor in the election, the country 
would have succumbed to the fears of the United States’ founding fathers: religious intolerance. 
How is the US no better than those who publicly persecuted those of different faiths? As the 
election depended on the statements Kennedy had made about his faith, then the role of anti-
Catholic sentiment influenced the scope of the election. Even after his address, Kennedy 
continued to have correspondence questioning his beliefs, thus his campaign continued to 
strategize how to combat such an issue.  
While the Houston Address settled many fears for the Protestant ministers, it did not put 
the religious issue to bed. A prominent Jesuit priest who was one of the Catholic church’s 
highest authorities on relations between the Church and State in the United States, Reverend 
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Gustave Weigel, spoke out against the anti-Catholic fears in a New York Times article.77 Within 
this article, Weigel explicitly legitimized Kennedy’s claims that the Catholic church would have 
no authority in the United States. If Kennedy or any Catholic were elected President, they would 
make decisions without regard to outside religious pressures or dictates. Even with such a 
distinct separation between Church and State, a religious candidate would be called to live what 
Weigel called “double life.”78 He addresses this key concept for the official “worshiped as he 
pleased in his private life, but in his public role ‘he is a man of the law which is framed for 
practical purposes and canonizes no philosophy or theology.”79 Kennedy would be forced to live 
with these distinct spheres, as a living example of the separation of church and state as reflected 
in Kennedy’s own Houston Address. The concept of comforting the fears of the anti-Catholic 
supporters became a key component of Kennedy’s campaign strategies.  
 Theodore Sorenson created a document considered the “Bailey Memorandum” that 
outlined the key elements in the fight against anti-Catholicism. This memo demonstrated the first 
religious-centered strategy within the general election campaign. The memo, named after the 
Connecticut Democratic Chairman John Bailey, explained that Catholics represented a large 
population in 14 states which could have a large electoral effect.80 In an attempt to both deflect 
anti-Catholic sentiment as well as gain Catholic votes, Sorensen developed a plan that put forth 
Kennedy’s positions. Various campaign interns assembled a fact book with various speeches, 
voting records, and statements from religious bodies. This book would placate the American 
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Catholics by reciting their own beliefs in terms of the federal government while simultaneously 
combating the fears that anti-Catholic supporters propagated.81 This book, distributed to 
thousands of voters, represented the ability to combat the issues presented by the press but also 
maintained Kennedy’s religious values. One section specifically dealt with the Position of the 
Roman Catholic Church within the United States, a subject hotly debated in the press. It said, “if 
tomorrow Catholics constructed a majority in our country, they would not seek a union of 
Church and State.”82 Due to this statement by an apostolic delegate to the United States, Cardinal 
Francis Spellman proved that no Catholic would wish for a violation of the separation of church 
and state whether they were running for president or not.83 With statements such as these, the 
campaign united Catholic voters in the restatement of their beliefs but denounced the claims 
made by anti-Catholic supporters in the press. Yet with this targeted election, the campaign team 
feared it would confirm the anti-Catholic notions.  
When the concept was brought to the candidate, Kennedy gave the team two alternatives: 
“reviving the anti-Catholicism by nominating a Catholic or alienating Catholics by rejecting 
Kennedy’s candidacy.”84 Either choice brought the religious issue to the forefront of the 
campaign.  Sorenson believed that through the Democratic majority in the House of 
Representatives, “Kennedy’s personal appeal, hard work and political operation produced as they 
had in the past Kenney should win. Only the religion issue could defeat him.”85 There needed to 
be a strategy that could reassure and bring voters into the fold while simultaneously combating 
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the anti-Catholic sentiment. Sorenson decided the best way to handle it would have a specialized 
team, “Community Relations,” who had the mission: “one to reach out to Jewish voters and to 
neutralize the religious issue.”86 When dealing with the religious issue, much of the duties of the 
team would call for responding to the flood of mail that came into the campaign on religious 
topics. Many of these respondents followed similar rhetoric: 
The Senator had made his position unmistakably clear and thus had done 
everything possible to remove the religious issue from the current campaign. 
Certainly, his doing this affords no grounds for newspaper editors, radio, and 
television directors to continue to belabor the subject, thus distracting the 
electorate from the really relevant issues of the campaign.87 
 
This response supplied the perfect example of the implementation of Sorenson’s strategy to 
neutralize the religion issue. Through their appeal to the press to halt their production of religious 
articles, they looked to take the fire out of the flames of the anti-Catholic sentiment to spread to 
the public. Instead, the press would print the “real” issues of the campaign, a key goal of 
Sorenson’s religious campaign strategy.  
Even Kennedy admitted the gamble that the Democratic party played in endorsing a 
candidate with such a controversial personal history, yet he remained optimistic.  
The Democratic Party had once again placed its confidence in the American 
people, and in their ability to rend a free, fair judgment – to uphold the 
Constitution and my Oath of Office - and to reject any kind of religious pressure 
or obligation that might directly or indirectly interfered with my conduct of the 
presidency in national interests. 88 
 
Kennedy passionately believed that the Democratic Party would support him and the American 
people to look past such a private issue. The party compiled a variety of Kennedy’s quotes on 
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various issues and placed it into a document that outlined every fear that the press had written. 
Kennedy supporters distributed these comments amongst the various conventions and mailed to 
Democrats to try to marginalize the issue. 
The support from the Democratic Party also came in the form of Kennedy’s running 
mate, Lyndon B. Johnson. Because of Johnson’s Texas origins, he became extremely valuable as 
the “Catholic Question” grew in the Lone Star State. His advisors had heard rumors of stirrings 
in the gossip from the Protestant leaders in the area.89 When Johnson was questioned regarding 
his affiliation with the Catholic candidate, Johnson stood firm in his support and drafted a letter 
that he sent out to anyone who questioned. The letter detailed Johnson’s opinion that religion 
should not be a part of the election but “cited Kennedy’s heroism in defense of his country and 
that Kennedy had faced the religion question fully, frankly and courageously.” 90 Johnson 
recognized the different religious compromises that Kennedy had to make in office and respected 
his ability to distinguish between what is good for the country rather than his allegiance to his 
faith.  
Kennedy’s beliefs faced a larger test in the few months up until the election. A scandal 
had broken out about Puerto Rican priests and their own country’s election. In late October, three 
American-born Bishops issued a statement “forbidding Catholics from voting for Governor Luis 
Munoz Marin and his Popular Democratic Party.”91 Marin and his Party strongly disagreed with 
the Catholic Church teachings on abortion and birth control, so the Catholic bishops sought to 
influence their candidates to stay loyal to the church. When this invasion of public policy broke 
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the news, the Kennedy campaign worried that the public would fear it could happen here. But 
Cardinal Francis Spellman, the Vatican’s apostolic delegate to the United States, supplied a key 
save. He claimed that Bishops of the United States had never taken such a position nor would 
they in the future.92 His statement confirmed that an instance such as this could not happen in 
America.  
As the Kennedy campaign continued to neutralize any religious issues, Sorenson 
discovered that the anti-Catholic sentiment was still gaining traction. Sorenson claimed in a 
meeting of the Community Relations team, that “over 300 different anti-Catholic tracts were 
distributed to over 20 million homes along with countless mailings, television, and radio 
broadcasts.”93 Where could this large amount of anti-Catholic sentiment come from? 
On September 7, 1960, a conference was held amongst prominent Republican Billy 
Graham and Norman Vincent Peale, who established the National Conference of Citizens for 
Religious Freedom in Washington D.C.94 Peale saw Kennedy as a threat to the liberty of the 
people, and it was his duty to gain support from the opposing party to stop Kennedy. Yet, due to 
Peale’s close friendship with Nixon, the Democratic leadership continued to associate anti-
Catholicism with the Republican party.95 The Kennedy campaign proceeded to view the 
Republican opposition and Peale’s organization as a strong factor in the anti-Catholic rhetoric in 
the public. In response to this growth, the Kennedy campaign actively pursued support from 
African Americans, Catholics, and religious minority voters in 1960.  
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Even among the tensions building between the Catholics and the Protestants, minority 
religious perspectives spoke out about their opinions in the context of the election. An article in 
the New York Tribune based out of Rosendale, New York, “The Jewish Vote” by Joseph Alsop, 
provided a third-party perspective on “the religious question.” 96  However, in terms of the 
opinions of “the middle to an upper-income Jewish group,” it was not a matter of religion but 
rather political views. Mrs. Sandra Gold, a Rosendale dentist’s wife supplied a testimony that 
proved the opinion held by many Jewish citizens from Rosendale. “Let’s put it this way, I’m for 
Kennedy because I’m anti-Nixon and because I think Kennedy will at least use men like Adlai 
Stevenson and Chester Bowles.”97 The issue had shifted towards the policies of the candidate, if 
one is not of either religious, the religious component is not the highest concern.  
Adlai Stevenson, who was a member of the Unitarian faith, ran against Kennedy for the 
Democratic nomination for president as well as in the election in 1952 and 1956. After Kennedy 
won the election, he appointed Stevenson as the United States Ambassador to the United 
Nations.98 Chester Bowles, who was also a Unitarian, played a prominent role on the platform 
committee for the Democratic National Convention during that year.99 This example 
strengthened the belief that she believed Kennedy would be a stronger president for he was more 
likely to see the utility of other members of his party. Based on her identification as “Anti-
Nixon,” she implied that she strongly disagreed with Nixon on many if not all accounts.100 “ 
 
96 Joseph Alop. “The Jewish Vote,” 22 September 1957 – 16 October 1960, News Clippings, 1960: February – 
October, John F. Kennedy Library Digital Collections; at https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-
viewer/archives/JWPP/001/JWPP-001-003, Accessed October 2019.  
97 Ibid. 
98 Wikipedia. “Adlai Stevenson II,” Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia. 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adlai_Stevenson_II#Family_and_religion. 
99Wikipedia. “Chester Bowles,” Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chester_Bowles. 
100 Joseph Alop. “The Jewish Vote,” News Clippings, 1960: February – October, John F. Kennedy Library Digital 
Collections; at https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JWPP/001/JWPP-001-003, Accessed October 2019. 
 30 
When broached about the subject of Kennedy’s religion, the general Jewish population at 
Rosendale did not see it as a primary concern. In the eyes of a housewife, who had observed the 
“Catholic issue,” from a third-party perspective, religion was not the focal point of the 
campaign.101 Yet, even though she perceived Kennedy to be unhurt by his religion, she still 
believed some of the things the media had propagated. “He might be in cohorts with the 
Pope.”102 The idea that she knew of these key issues proves how far the issue had come. Many 
Jewish people did not feel any concern, but some did recognize how Kennedy’s religion may be 
a key influence in his presidency.  
The idea of how influencing Kennedy’s religion affected others such as Protestant 
denominations such as Lutherans proved important in the context of the election. In an entry of 
the Chicago Daily News, “Lutherans Pick Up, Drop a Political Firecracker,” the importance of 
“the Catholics issue” in the media was greatly stressed. The opening line of the article states, 
“the candidate’s religion may become the hottest election issue of 1960.”103 As the article began 
with this line, it provided the legitimacy of how far the issue had come in the public eye. Some 
parishes had even gone on to meet to discuss the implications of this issue within their own 
parishes. “The problem of the religious faith of candidates for public office was brought up at the 
43rd annual meeting of the National Lutheran council.”104 Within this meeting of members, it was 
declared that Kennedy’s religion would play a crucial role in his presidency. “The religious faith 
of a public officer undoubtedly influences the conduct of his public office to a certain degree.”105 
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In giving a voice, especially in terms of a large meeting of high-ranking religious officials, the 
legitimacy of the issue of Kennedy’s presidency continued to grow.  
People were not ignorant of the anti-Catholic sentiment growing because of Kennedy’s 
candidacy. Dr. F. Eppling Relnartz, the secretary of the United Lutheran Church felt that 
Protestants should prove their anti-Catholic message. He did not outwardly support Roman 
Catholics in fact, he believed that “a strong tendency of Roman Catholics to entrench themselves 
there and to gather power around themselves.”106Outspoken advocates of this anti-Catholic 
movement fueled the fire to the public sentiment, as the presidency of the Catholic candidate 
grew closer.  
Throughout the election, Kennedy gained strength by appealing to those who felt 
oppressed by the white Protestant Anglo-Saxon majority while Nixon had to navigate the 
religious issue uniquely. Kennedy’s campaign strategies allowed for significant consequences, 
positive ones for their candidate but negative ones for Nixon. He believed that Kennedy had 
abused the Catholic issue which he then felt “justified later tolerance for ‘dirty tricks’ within his 
campaign team.107  
 Richard Nixon’s religious problem was the converse to Kennedy’s during the election. 
His campaign team questioned how Nixon “could stave off a massive movement of Catholic 
Republicans to his opponent while simultaneously appealing to Protestants, all without appearing 
to be a religious bigot?”108 Nixon had to appeal to the underlying anti-Catholic sentiment without 
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looking as though he was a supporter. He often looked toward his former President at the time, 
Dwight D. Eisenhower for aid in how to marginalize Kennedy’s religious issue.109  
 Nixon reflected on the strategies used in the election during the fall of 1961 when writing 
his memoir, Six Crises. He held key beliefs that stirred the election in Kennedy’s favor through 
the combatting of the anti-Catholic sentiment. He strongly believed that “Kennedy and his 
campaign team used religion to Kennedy’s advantage,” as seen through the various speeches 
centering the Catholic issue.110 Nixon himself took the opposite approach, one that conformed to 
the Protestant values in the US Constitution, where he would keep the religion out of his 
campaign.111 Religious thoughts, as well as religious intolerance thought, had no place in an 
election that dealt with the public office. Where Nixon chose to distance himself from the 
religious issue, which ultimately hurt him and helped Kennedy win the election.  
Based on Richard Nixon’s theories behind the religious issue, his campaign team created 
a variety of different strategies to marginalize the “Catholic question.” During an article in the 
New York Times, “Nixon Says GOP Enters Campaign as the Underdog,” Nixon stated, “religion 
will be in this campaign to the extent that the candidates of either side talk about it. I shall never 
talk about it and we’ll start right now.”112 In order to win the election, with a bar on the religious 
issue, Nixon wanted to target the large percentage of conservative white Southern voters who 
would not be moved with the Catholic rhetoric.113 He had to appeal to those whom Kennedy 
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could not win over, but he also had to counterbalance Kennedy’s momentum by appealing to the 
African American vote. He saw these voters a method of influencing others in his favor. He 
created a “Common Government Conference,” where he and Martin Luther King Jr. were the 
keynote speakers. He hoped that by throwing his support behind such a prominent figure in the 
ongoing Civil Rights battle at the time and opening the conversation, he could win over a large 
part of the African American vote.  
Even though Nixon had barred religion from campaign discussions, he knew he could not 
discount the role of Catholicism. He created his religious strategy to counter Kennedy’s own 
“Community Relations.” Nixon’s strategy relied on a long-standing relationship with a Catholic 
priest, Father John Cronin to outreach to other Catholics. Cronin as a leading authority on 
Catholic teachings, he worked hard to “prevent a stampede to Kennedy, without being seen as an 
anti-Catholic bigot and instigator.”114 Cronin was dealt with the difficult task of making Nixon 
appeal to the religious sects without contradicting Nixon’s prior statements. The role of Cronin 
centered around the following: writing speeches, offering political advice, and creating 
relationships between Nixon and the Catholic Church.115 
Cronin expressed many religious implications for Nixon’s strategy that were too religious 
in nature. However, the Christian Century and organizations such as the Protestants and Other 
Americans United for the Separation of Church and State took the ideas and used them against 
Kennedy in earlier publications. Nixon was able to have the anti-Kennedy sentiment propagated 
while avoiding criticizing the Protestant opponents.116 He could not do any of it without the aid 
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of his valuable speechwriter and advisor Cronin. Cronin demonstrated the reach and power of the 
Catholic vote as well as reminding Nixon of the threat of Kennedy in the religious sense.  
Cronin’s fears of religious bloc voting came to fruition during the Wisconsin primary. 
The results of the primary proved a large push for Kennedy which would inversely show how 
many Protestants could come to Nixon’s side, however, the issue came within the general 
election campaign. Robert Finch, Nixon’s campaign director recalled the numbers as a large 
problem due to “Kennedy’s ability to attract ‘Crossover Catholic Republicans’ who registered as 
Democrats to vote for Kennedy in that state’s Democratic primary.”117 It seemed to the Nixon 
campaign that religion became a key factor for the voters and would greatly influence the 
election.  
The religious issue for the voters rather than the candidates called for aid outside of the 
Nixon campaign, specifically in different anti-Kennedy organizations. These organizations 
reflected the similar sentiment of the nativist groups that Al Smith had fought during the 1928 
election. The groups of 1960 sought to “unite a variety of Protestant groups to pressure 
Protestants to vote against a Catholic.”118 These different Protestant sections included the 
Citizens for Religious Freedom by the National Association for Evangelicals, Vice President of 
the Southern Baptist Convention Revered W.O. Vaught of the Pastor of the First Baptist Church 
in Little Rock, as well as the Assemblies of God and the Revered Zimmerman.119 The key 
organization in this anti-Kennedy and the anti-Catholic sentiment was the Protestants and Other 
Americans United for the Separation of Church and State (POAU). This national organization 
had the sole focus of beating Kennedy due to his religious affiliations. Glenn Archer, the 
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Executive Director, proved that this fear of Catholicism held a large threat, “the Roman Catholic 
hierarchy had a box full of demands which violate our Constitution and give a special privilege 
to them alone.”120 
Near the end of the campaign, as Kennedy’s campaign kept up the momentum, Nixon hit 
a few speed bumps that ended his election chances. In another media appearance when asked on 
the aspect of religion, Nixon responded in saying “the only real and legitimate religious issue in 
an American political campaign would be or would arise if one of the candidates for the 
Presidency had no faith in God if he had no religion.”121 The requirement that one had to be 
religious, but it didn’t matter what denomination, seemed to matter greatly in Nixon’s mind. The 
public criticized him strongly for this seemed to contradict the notions displayed in this election. 
In response to the disrupted public, Nixon appealed to the press again by clarifying that “the 
Constitution, of course, does not apply and does not ask for or require any religious affiliation for 
any candidates for public office.”122 He needed to verify to the public that he was not in favor of 
a violation of Article IV in the United States Constitution.123 Yet, even with this slip up the worst 
mistake was to come.  
The downfall in the religious issue on Nixon came on the shoulders of E.X. James, the 
editor of the Baptist Standard.124 In an interview with James, Kennedy reasserted his opposition 
to the public funding of parochial schools. This aspect of domestic policy proved to be 
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catastrophic to the Nixon campaign. Nixon, as a member of the Quaker religion, had often 
advocated for federal grants for sectarian colleges but the real blow came from his running mate 
Henry Cabot Lodge, who outwardly spoke of his support for federal aid to parochial schools.  
There is, however, public responsibility for elementary and secondary education, 
a responsibility which under our Constitution rests with the United States. 
Therefore, any aid which the federal government wants to give in the field of 
elementary and secondary education should be given to the states. It will then be 
up to each state to decide whether federal funds given to each state should be used 
for both public and private schools.125  
 
Because of the statement by Lodge, all the Protestant and anti-Catholic critics were in the 
difficult position of seeing the Republican ticket embrace one of the policies that they thought 
Kennedy would support through his Catholicism. Kennedy had proven to stay committed to his 
stance on the separation of church and state, were Nixon allude to a potential violation in the 
forms of the federal funding of religious schools. Through this slip of policy, the Nixon 
campaign took a large hit in terms of polling numbers that led to silence about the religious issue 
on the Republican front.126 
The final time that Nixon broached the subject of religion in a national broadcast 
occurred the Sunday before the election. In this speech he had called for the voters not to “take 
his or Senator Kennedy’s faith into account.”127 To the audience, it seemed to be a simple 
reminder to look at the candidates in terms of their policies rather than their private lives. The 
Kennedy campaign took this as “an unvarnished reminder to Protestants that Kennedy was a 
Catholic.”128 The Nixon campaign used it as a final effort to pull away from the hazardous 
school issue.  
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Kennedy’s Catholicism became the most baffling issue of the campaign. It supplied an 
opportunity to capitalize on his faith rather than as a downfall, through their extensive strategies 
while, Nixon’s failure to understand the issue led to Kennedy’s victory. Many scholars have 
argued that Nixon and Lodge’s blunder at the end of the election about an issue that had been 
key to the American public from the beginning of the nation proved determinantal. It was the 
final straw in the election.  
John F. Kennedy defeated Richard Nixon in the 1960 Presidential election by 84 electoral 
votes and by less than two-tenths of one percentage point in the national popular vote. The 
election was the closest popular vote margin of the twentieth century.129 Kennedy’s eventual 
victory in the election reflected a victory for the American Catholic population even if it was not 
his intention. His presidency would usher in a new wave of change that called for a push for 
religious tolerance. As Everett Palmer wrote following the election, “once [the Catholics] know 
our quarrel is not with them, their minds will be more open to the truth by which both we and 
they can be saved.”130 The time for religious prejudice had come and David had beaten Goliath.  
The private and public spheres collided in Kennedy’s campaign for his religious personal 
beliefs became a key factor within his election for public office. As written in an article in the 
Washington D.C. Tribune, the author explained how politics are complicated enough even 
without the public focuses on things that are not necessarily public policy.131 Even with all the 
public’s fear of Catholic influence, Kennedy overcame a blend of his two spheres of life. 
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Kennedy’s campaign tactics and patience turned the “Catholic Issue” into an advantage which 
led to his historic victory. One could assume that religious intolerance could finally be over, and 
there could no external threat to American Protestant values.  
As generations of Americans were suspicious of the Roman Catholic Church’s influence, 
more religious minorities would come under scrutiny throughout time. Early American history 
demonstrated an emphasis on the private life of candidates specifically religious views, but when 
faced with the prospect of a different president, Americans were not tolerant of Catholics in the 
1960 election. This avenue of thinking continues today about those who practice Islam within 
America. In the election of Ilhan Omar in 2018 for the United States House of Representatives 
from Minnesota’s fifth congressional district, she represents the challenge of public approval 
within the 21st century.132 For she is one of the first Muslim women elected to serve in the United 
States House of Representatives, she similar to Kennedy became the target of much prejudice 
thought and actions since taking office.  
When Democrats in the House sought “to change a rule banning headwear on the floor of 
the House accommodate incoming Muslim lawmakers.”133 Even though this law supported those 
elected beyond the Anglo-Protestant perspective, it became the target for another round of 
religious intolerance. In following the law, E.W. Jackson, The Awakening radio host, propagated 
an episode complaining about Muslims taking over Congress.134 One of the various anti-Islamic 
quotes stressed the theme of fear of the other similar to the anti-Catholic proponents during 
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Kennedy’s election, “the threat to humanity is not merely radical Islam. The threat to humanity is 
Islam, period.”135 The fear of the other presented in this tirade demonstrated how religious 
intolerance did not end win Kennedy was elected. However, where Kennedy did not believe his 
election represented a step towards religious tolerance, Omar called her election “a rejection of 
religious bigotry.”136 Religious intolerance occurs even to this day for, many similar incidences 
of religious intolerance have been present throughout Omar’s term. Kennedy’s election reflected 
great strides to overcome such a fear, it did not end there. 
Idealists hope that the issue of religious intolerance would fall behind but the core 
problem of fear in the exploitation of religious ideologies continues today. Patience for “first 
candidates” becomes more than virtue but a necessity.137 A first candidate is one that is the first 
of a specific characteristic, as Kennedy was the first Catholic President. First Candidates must 
know how to be patient over many campaigns and years in the hope to inspire change for the 
future. In his Houston Address, Kennedy demonstrates this aspect: “Today, I may be the victim – 
but tomorrow it may be you – until the whole fabric of our harmonious society is ripped at a time 
of great national peril.”138 If our religious intolerance as a society does not cease the negative 
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